Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 47
Issue 3 May 2014

Article 5

2014

The Monetary Fifth Column: The Eurodollar Threat to Financial
Stability and Economic Sovereignty
Stephen A. Fowler

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Stephen A. Fowler, The Monetary Fifth Column: The Eurodollar Threat to Financial Stability and Economic
Sovereignty, 47 Vanderbilt Law Review 825 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol47/iss3/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

NOTES

The Monetary Fifth Column:
to
Threat
Eurodollar
The
Financial Stability and Economic
Sovereignty
ABSTRACT

Eurodollars are dollar-denominated deposit liabilities of
banks outside the United States. Even though estimates of the
size of the Eurodollar market exceed $5 trillion, these
instruments are virtually unregulated. Legal scholarship has
very little to say about Eurodollars,and the economic literature
on the subject is geared toward economists and banking
professionals rather than policy makers and attorneys.
Furthermore, the economic scholarship is focused on describing
the way Eurodollar markets function rather than critical
examination of their nature and attendant risks. This Note is an
attempt to get to the bottom of this ubiquitous yet mysterious
financial instrument. It describes the nature and history of the
Eurodollar and discusses potential challenges the Eurodollar
market poses to financial stability and monetary sovereignty. It
then examines the evolution of international bank regulation,
pointing out why current measures are insufficient to address
the risks posed by the Eurodollar.Finally, it considers possible
solutions to these problems and proposes an approach to
regulating the Eurodollar market consisting of a scheme of
internationalreserve requirements.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In 2008, at the height of the financial crisis, the biggest
beneficiaries of the Federal Reserve's emergency loans were not
American banks but European ones.' By means of an interbank
transfer called a foreign central bank liquidity swap, the U.S. central
bank lent nearly $600 billion to foreign central banks. 2 The Federal
Reserve reopened these dollar-liquidity swap lines during the
Eurozone crisis, loaning ailing foreign institutions an additional $109
billion.3 At the center of these foreign bank bailouts was a financial
instrument called the Eurodollar.
Outside of the world of traders and economists, little is spoken of
the Eurodollar. For most attorneys, indeed for most people, the words
Eurodollar or Eurocurrency probably bring to mind the transnational
currency introduced in 1999 and currently used as the medium of
exchange in eighteen European nations. 4 However, a Eurocurrency
need not have any relation to Europe or the Euro. A Eurocurrency is
a deposit liability issued by or "held by"5 a bank located in one

Bradley Keoun & Craig Torres, Foreign Banks Tapped Fed's Secret Lifeline
1.
Most at CrisisPeak, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201104-01/foreign-banks-tapped-fed-s-lifeline-most-as-bernanke-kept-borrowers-secret.html
[http://perma.cc/Q8R4-YLMB] (archived Feb. 14, 2014); see infra Part II.E.
2.
Central Bank Liquidity Swaps Held by the Federal Reserve: All Maturities
(SWPT), FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUis, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/
series/SWPT [http://perma.cc/34R9-ZD2R] (archived Feb. 15, 2014) (last updated Dec.
26, 2013, 3:47 PM) (showing $583,135,000 in liquidity swaps held by the Federal
Reserve during the week of December 17, 2008) [hereinafter Liquidity Swap Chart].
3.
Id.
The Euro, EUR. COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/economyfinance/euro/
4.
index en.htm [http://perma.cc/PQ5Z-QSPU] (archived Feb. 15, 2014) (last visited Mar.
10, 2014).
5.
An important note on terminology: in day-to-day speech, people often
describe banks as "holding" deposits for customers. This terminology implies that
commercial banking is a bailment-based system. However, this is not an accurate
analogy. See Peter S. Smedresman & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Eurodollars,
Multinational Banks, and National Laws, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 737 (1989)
(explaining that a depositor's funds become the property of the bank and may be used
by the bank as it sees fit); see also discussion infra Part II.A. As Morgan Ricks explains,
a bank deposit is an instrument that is "issued" by a bank. It is an IOU from a bank to
a depositor-a short-term loan that is called whenever a depositor makes a
withdrawal. See Morgan Ricks, Regulating Money Creation After the Crisis, 1 HARV.
BUS. L. REV. 75, 78-79 (2011) (discussing the nature of a banking deposit); Morgan
Ricks, A Former Treasury Adviser on How to Really Fix Wall Street, NEW REPUBLIC
(Dec. 17, 2011), http://www.newrepublic.com/ article/politics/98659/wall-street-term-outpanic [http://perma.cc/CK6T-YSNY] (archived Feb. 15, 2014) (describing deposits as
"short-term IOUs [that] are the economy's primary medium of exchange"). Thus, the
bank is not "holding" anything for the depositor; the depositor is holding an IOU from
the bank. Deposits are thus most accurately described as "deposit liabilities of banks,"
but where sources describe banks as "holding" deposits, I will maintain the terminology
used by the source.
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country but denominated in units of another country's currency. 6 A
Eurodollar,for example, is a type of Eurocurrency consisting of a U.S.
dollar-denominated deposit in a bank outside the United States.7
While this is a benign enough definition, Eurodollars comprise an
estimated $5 trillion market 8 and present all the attendant risks of
such a large market.9
Despite their prevalence, Eurodollars are some of the least
understood financial instruments. Describing them in 1969, decades
after their initial creation,' 0 the preeminent economist Milton
Friedman wrote that Eurodollars were "the latest example of the
mystifying quality of money creation to even the most sophisticated
bankers, let alone other businessmen." 1 ' After recounting a story
where a "high official of an international financial organization" gave
an explanation of Eurodollars that was "almost complete nonsense,"
Friedman went on to refer to them as nothing more than the creation
of a "bookkeeper's pen."' 2
Given this lack of understanding, it should come as no surprise
that the Eurodollar market is largely unregulated.' 3 This presents a
number of problems. First, due to the sheer size of the Eurodollar
market, its failure poses systemic risk.14 A second obstacle is equally
problematic. Because Eurodollars represent a market for dollars that
is not controlled by the Federal Reserve, it has the potential to affect
or even undermine the Federal Reserve's ability to control the supply
of U.S. dollars. Thus, the Eurodollar represents a potential

6.
Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 5, at 743; Eurocurrency, OXFORD
DICTIONARIES, http://oxforddictionaries.con/definitionlenglishlEurocurrency [http://perma.
cc/X4PM-LTEC] (archived Feb. 15, 2014).
7.
Robert C. Effros, The Whys and Wherefores of Eurodollars, 23 BUS. L. 629,
629 (1968). "Eurodollar" refers to deposits of U.S. dollars in foreign banks;
Eurocurrency is the more general term that can be applied to any deposit liability of
one country's bank in denominations in another county's currency. Id.
8.
Dong He & Robert McCauley, Eurodollar Banking and Currency
Internationalisation, BIS Q. REV., June 2012, at 38, 39 tbl.1; see ROBERT J. CARBAUGH,
INTERNATIONAL EcONOMICS 531 (13th ed. 2011) (estimating the actual size of the
Eurocurrency market at $5 trillion in the late 2000s); Ben Protess, Landon Thomas Jr.
& Chad Bray, U.S. Investigates Currency Trades by Major Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14,
2013, at Al, available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/14/u-s-investigatescurrency-trades-by-major-banks/ [http://perma.cc/76MB-QPGW] (archived Feb. 15,
2014) (noting that the currency market dwarfs other securities markets).
9.
See infra Part III.
10.
See infra Part II.B.
11.
Milton Friedman, The Euro-DollarMarket: Some First Principles,MORGAN
GUARANTY SURV., Oct. 1969, at 4.
Id.
12.
13.
CARBAUGH, supra note 8, at 531; Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 5,
at 743.
14.
See Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 5, at 743-44 (estimating the size
of the Eurocurrency market as of 1988).
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abrogation of national monetary sovereignty.15 This threatens not
only the financial markets, which rely on the effectiveness of Federal
Reserve controls, but also the ability of the United States to set its
own monetary policy.
This Note analyzes the economic and sovereign risks posed by
the continued lack of regulation of the Eurodollar market. Its purpose
is to demystify the Eurodollar in hopes that a greater understanding
of this instrument will encourage the legal community to assume a
larger role in creating rules governing such financial instruments.
Part II provides relevant background on the emergence and current
state of the Eurodollar market, including a description of the U.S.
Federal Reserve bailout of foreign banks during and in the wake of
the financial crisis. Part III discusses the Eurodollar market's
potential threat to financial stability and analyzes the implications of
the Eurodollar market on national sovereignty. Part IV analyzes
potential remedies by analogy, examining schemes used to address
earlier problems in international finance, specifically, the Breton
Woods Agreement and the Basel Accords. Part V discusses possible
solutions and recommends that the United States advance an
international scheme imposing reserve requirements on institutions
holding Eurodollars and provide for an international clearinghouse
for Eurodollar transactions. Part VI concludes that global financial
stability demands prudent regulation of the Eurodollar market.

II. BACKGROUND

A. What Is a Eurodollar?
In order to understand what a Eurodollar is, it is important first
to understand the nature of a bank deposit. A bank deposit (or
"demand deposit" because it is available on demand) is not, in fact, a
bailment. 16 The bank is not "holding" the depositor's cash as a
parking garage would hold one's car. When a depositor makes a
deposit, the funds become the property of the bank, and, in exchange,
the depositor receives a claim against the bank for the amount of the
deposit." The bank "buys" the cash in exchange for a short term IOU
(representing the bank's deposit liability).S Thus, the relationship

15.
This Note will analyze the issue largely from the perspective of the United
States, but the same could be said of any nation whose currency is the subject of a
Eurocurrency.
16.
Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 5, at 737.
17.
Id.
18.
See Ricks, A Former Treasury Adviser on How to Really Fix Wall Street,
supra note 5 (describing deposits as short term IOUs from banks).
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between the bank and depositor is more like a contractual
relationship than a relationship between a bailor and bailee.19
A certificate of deposit (CD) is a type of deposit that serves as a
good demonstration of this concept. A CD is a deposit, evidenced by a
certificate, which matures after a specific amount of time (which is
why it is called a time deposit).20 The purchaser of the CD can redeem
their certificate for its value at the maturity date, but the bank is not
simply holding the money of the CD owner. The deposit itself is an
instrument of value, not just a log of the amount of money given to
the bank.2 1 The same principle applies to basic deposits, albeit
without the maturity date or actual certificate.
At the most basic level, Eurodollars are "deposit liabilities,
denominated in dollars, of banks outside the United States." 22 In
other words, they are short term IOUs for dollars that are issued by
banks outside the United States. This means that even though these
banks are in other countries, there is no exchange rate (a Eurodollar
is worth the same as any other dollar), and, at least in theory, a cash
payment of dollars will satisfy a bank's Eurodollar liability. 23 They
are very close substitutes for U.S. dollars.
Like CDs, virtually all Eurodollars are time deposits. 24 These
time deposits mature at various rates, ranging from overnight to
several years (maturities greater than a year are technically
Eurobonds), but most mature between one week and six months. 25
Thus, a more precise definition of Eurodollars is that they are dollardenominated time deposit liabilities of non-U.S. institutions. 2 6

Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 5, at 737, 739.
19.
20.
See MARCIA STIGUM, THE MONEY MARKET 1210, 1233 (3d ed. 1990)
(defining certificate of deposit and time deposit).
21.
See Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 5, at 739-41 ("A CD, as seen by
the drafters of the U.C.C., is thus a combination of receipt and an evidence of debt,
similar in the latter respect to a promissory note.").
22.
Friedman, supra note 11, at 5; STIGUM, supra note 20, at 199; Effros, supra
note 7, at 629.
23.
Effros supra note 7, at 629. In practice, banks that hold Eurodollars are
rarely called upon to discharge deposit obligations in cash. Friedman, supra note 11, at
6.
24.
Marvin Goodfriend, Eurodollars, in FED. RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND,
INSTRUMENTS OF THE MONEY MARKET 48, 51 (1993); W.P. HOGAN & I.F. PEARCE, THE
INCREDIBLE EURODOLLAR 3 (1982); Friedman, supra note 11, at 6; see STIGUM, supra
note 20, at 202 (explaining the effect of transfers on foreign and domestic balance
sheets).
Goodfriend, supra note 24, at 51; see Friedman, supra note 11, at 5
25.
(discussing the difference between Eurodollars and other dollar-denominated claims).
Friedman notes that all Eurodollars are "short-term obligations," but that the precise
definition of "short-term" is up for debate. However, the definition of short-term is
neither important for analyzing the instrument, nor this Note. Id.
26.
Ronald David Greenberg, The Eurodollar Market: The Case for Disclosure,
71 CALIF. L. REV. 1492, 1493 (1983).
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Eurodollars are created when dollar balances are transferred
from a bank branch in the United States to a bank branch abroad.2 7
For example, suppose an investor, John, wants to open an account at
Citibank in London and funds the account with a $1,000 check from
his Chase account in New York. 28 John is essentially exchanging his
deposit in New York for an equivalent deposit in London.
Functionally, the two assets are the same to John, but while John's
deposit at Chase was a demand deposit, his deposit at Citibank in
London is a Eurodollar deposit.
Furthermore, even though John makes his deposit in London, no
actual cash leaves the United States. When John deposits his check,
Chase transfers $1,000 to Citibank. However, Chase transfers the
money to Citibank in New York. More accurately, Chase transfers
$1,000 in reserves from its own account at the New York Federal
Reserve to Citibank's account at the New York Federal Reserve.29 As
a result, Citibank New York "owes" money to Citibank London.3 0 This
"debt" is settled by adding $1,000 to Citibank London's New York
dollar account (essentially a checking account that the London branch
holds at the New York branch).3 1 At the end of the transaction,
Citibank London has a $1,000 Eurodollar liability to John with an
offsetting credit from Citibank New York, and Citibank New York
has an additional $1,000 in its account at the Federal Reserve.3 2
Notably, no funds ever leave the Federal Reserve in New York; they
just move from Chase's account to Citibank's.
In the example above, the bank accepting John's check has
branches in both countries implicated in the transaction. However,
this is not required. Had John chosen a foreign bank without a
Federal Reserve account, the transaction would have been virtually
the same. The only difference would be that the foreign bank would
use a New York bank as a clearinghouse for the transaction. Or, to
extend the analogy above, the foreign bank would need a checking
account at a bank in New York (filling the role of Citibank New York
in the example above). 33
Furthermore the "depositor" need not be a nonbank. In the
example above, instead of being John's assets, suppose the
Eurodollars were assets of "JohnBank LLC." JohnBank could use
27.
See Effros, supra note 7, 629-30 (noting the importance of the transfer to
the creation of Eurodollars); Dollars That Go Abroad-But Not Really, THE MORGAN
GUARANTY SURV., Dec. 1961, at 4, 5 ("The simple act of transfer to a foreign depositary
is what makes just plain dollars into Euro-dollars.").
See examples in Friedman, supra note 11, at 7-8, and STIGUM, supra note
28.
20, at 199.
29.
STIGUM, supra note 20, at 201.
30.
Id. at 202.
Id.
31.
Id.
32.
33.
See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 11, at 7-9. In Friedman's hypothetical,
"Bank H" is a London based bank that has a deposit account at Morgan Guaranty.
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Eurodollars to loan to other banks and to nonbank customers, either
directly as dollars or after conversion into another currency, or use
the Eurodollars as money market instruments. 34 Once created,
Eurodollars can be exchanged among banks without any connection
to the United States.3 5 Functionally then, it is also possible to think
of Eurodollars not as funds, but as decisions: Eurodollars are created
when a banker abroad decides to assume a dollar-denominated
deposit liability, regardless of whether a single cent leaves the
Federal Reserve.
Finally, a note on nomenclature: Eurodollars, defined as dollardenominated bank deposit liabilities outside the United States, are a
type of Eurocurrency, which is the umbrella term for deposits of
currencies transferred to banks outside of their respective home
countries. 36 Other types of Eurocurrencies include Euroyen,
Eurosterling or Europound, and formerly Euromarks.3 7 Since the
creation of the Euro (i.e. the currency), there are even Euroeuro
deposits. All these terms are, in fact, misnomers. 8 A Japanese bank
with dollar-denominated deposit liabilities would still have
Eurodollar liabilities. The names are the result of the history of the
instruments rather than their function.39 At the inception of the
market, most of the banks seeking dollar deposits were European
institutions. 40 By moving dollars to a European bank, a depositor was
said to have made a "Euro-dollar deposit," hence the term
Eurodollars.41
B. A Brief History of the Eurodollar
Shortly after the start of the Cold War, Communist Bloc banks
became hesitant to store their dollar balances in the United States for
fear that the U.S. government might freeze their assets. 42 Instead,
these banks looked to Western European financial institutions as
both a place to store dollar-denominated assets and as a source of
34.
Effros, supra note 7, at 633-35. Robert Effros describes the three principle
uses for Eurodollars as: financing international trade, financing in the domestic
economy as an alternative to financing in local currency, or use by the bank itself as a
money market instrument. Id.; see infra Part II.C.
35.
See STIGUM, supra note 20, at 202-04 (describing a hypothetical Eurodollar
loan from Citi London to Electricitgde France).
36.
Greenberg, supra note 26, at 1493 n.8; see DILEEP MEHTA & HUNG-GAY
FUNG, INTERNATIONAL BANK MANAGEMENT 81 (2008).

37.
STIGUM, supra note 20, at 271-72.
38.
Id. at 200.
See infra Part IIB; Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 5, at 743 n.26.
39.
40.
STIGUM, supra note 20, at 199-200.
41.
Id. For the purposes of this Note, I will use the terms Eurodollar and
Eurocurrency interchangeably.
42.
Effros, supra note 7, at 637; Dong He & Robert N. McCauley, Offshore
Markets for the Domestic Currency: Monetary and Financial Stability Issues 4 (Bank
for Int'l Settlements, Working Paper No. 320, 2010).
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credit. 43 As tensions with the United States heightened, Eastern Bloc
central banks moved dollar balances from New York to London, and
these balances became the seed funds of the Eurodollar market. 4 4
Once established, the market for Eurodollars grew quickly because of
certain advantages it enjoyed over the traditional sources of dollar
financing. First, European banks were willing and able to operate on
narrower margins than American banks, meaning that depositors
enjoyed higher returns and borrowers benefitted from lower interest
rates. 45 Second, because the European banks were not subject to
certain Federal Reserve regulations, they were able to offer interest
on a broader range of deposits. 46 Finally, regulations of the British
Pound in 1957 forbade British banks from lending the pound sterling
to overseas customers; London banks found they could avoid losing
business by offering dollar-denominated financing. 47
The Eurodollar market matured in the 1960s as the United
States invested heavily in Europe. 48 By the late 1980s, the size of the
market for all Eurocurrencies was estimated over $4.5 trillion. 4 9
Recent estimates place the size of the Eurodollar market at
approximately $5 trillion,5 0 which represents approximately 60
percent of the total market for all Eurocurrencies. 5 '
The rapid growth of the Eurodollar market did not go unnoticed.
As early as 1979, Congress investigated placing potential controls on
the Eurodollar market. 52 In 1979, Representative James Leach
introduced H.R. 3962, "The Euro-currency Control Act of 1979," in
order to "establish reserve requirements on certain Eurocurrency
liabilities."53 The bill was motivated by "the excessive growth in the
Eurocurrency market, a disproportionate share of which [was]
comprised of U.S. dollars, requir[ing] the Congress to assess the

43.
See Effros, supra note 7, at 637 (describing Communist banks' use of
Western European banks to store dollars).
44.
See STIGUM, supra note 20, at 207-09 (discussing the history of the
Eurodollar market).
45.
Effros, supranote 7, at 637; CARBAUGH, supranote 8, at 531.
46.
See Effros, supra note 7, at 629 (noting that European banks were not
subject to Regulation Q and could pay interest on sight deposits); Friedman, supra note
11, at 6 ("Without Regulation Q and the exchange controls ... the Euro-dollar market,
though it might still have existed, would not have reached anything like its present
dimensions.").
47.
Effros, supra note 7, at 638.
48.
Greenberg, supra note 26, at 1494.
49.
Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 5, at 743-44.
50.
He & McCauley, supra note 8, at 38, 39 tbl.1; CARBAUGH, supra note 8, at
531.
51.
MEHTA & FUNG, supra note 36, at 84.
HOGAN & PEARCE, supra note 24, at 106.
52.
53.
Congressional Research Serv., Summary: H.R. 3962-96th Congress (19791980), CONGRESS.GOV, http://beta.congress.govbill/96th-congress/house-bill/3962?q=%
[http://perma.cc/34Z5-4UAD]
7B%22search%22:%5B%22H.R.%203962%20%22%5D%7D
(archived Feb. 14, 2014) (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).
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impact of the Eurodollar market on the conduct of domestic monetary
policy, particularly as it relates to investment and credit
conditions." 54 The bill was referred to the Subcommittee on Domestic
Monetary Policy and the Subcommittee on International Trade,
Investment, and Monetary Policy for hearings, where it died.55 In the
years since, the United States has not attempted to pass any
significant controls on the Eurodollar market.
C. Eurodollar Uses
Eurocurrencies allow investors to take a long position in a
country's currency without keeping the deposit in that country. 56 This
practice enables the depositor to avoid the potential economic and
political risks of keeping deposits in the country of origin.57 The
ability to avoid such risks is precisely why the Soviets chose the
Eurodollar as their instrument of choice after the Second World
War.58 These features of Eurocurrencies mean that the instruments
can be employed to a number of ends.
There are three basic uses of Eurodollar balances by commercial
banks outside the United States: 1) lending to nonbanks in dollars, 2)
lending to nonbanks after conversion into the local currency or a
different foreign currency, and 3) placing funds in the U.S. money
market.5 9 There are several reasons that institutional borrowers and
depositors (essentially lenders) are attracted to the Eurodollar. From
the perspective of the depositor, Eurodollar deposits provide interest
rate premiums over deposits or CDs in U.S.-based banks.60 From the
borrower's perspective, Eurodollars provide an alternate avenue of
credit for those seeking dollars. 61 Indeed, the deposit interest rate on
Eurodollars is typically higher than the corresponding rate on dollars,
and the loan interest rate is typically lower than the U.S. rate. 62

54.
The EurocurrencyMarket ControlAct of 1979: Hearing on H.R. 3962 Before
the Subcomm. on Domestic Monetary Policy and the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade, Inc., &
Monetary Policy of the Comm. on Banking, Finance, & Urban Affairs, 96th Cong. 1
(1979) (statement of Rep. Mitchell, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Domestic Monetary
Policy).
55.
Congressional Research Serv., Summary: H.R. 3962, supra note 53.
56.
MEHTA & FUNG, supra note 36, at 81. A long position is simply when an
investor owns an asset outright, as opposed to a short position where the investor has a
net deficit of that asset in the hopes it will decline in value. THOMAS P. FITCH,
DICTIONARY OF BANKING TERMs 276, 419 (Irwin L. Kellner & Donald G. Simonson eds.,
6th ed. 2012).
57.
MEHTA & FUNG, supranote 36, at 81.
58.
Id.; see supraPart II.B.
59.
BANK FOR INT'L SE'PPLEMENTS, THIRTY-FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT 132
(1963-64).
60.
Id. at 136.
61.
See Effros, supra note 7, at 634-36 (discussing principal uses for
Eurodollars).
62.
MEHTA & FUNG, supranote 36, at 83.
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For example, suppose a contractor in Brazil wants to finance an
infrastructure project in dollars because of favorable exchange rates;
he or she can use a Eurodollar loan.63 Alternatively, perhaps a
borrower already knows he or she wants a dollar-denominated loan,
and he or she can get a more favorable interest rate through a bank
in his or her own country than from one in New York.6 4 This is
another reason to prefer Eurodollar financing. Relatedly, the lower
interest rate a borrower can secure on a dollar-denominated loan
sometimes justifies a Eurodollar loan that is subsequently converted
to the local currency. 65
These uses notwithstanding, the principle driver of the
expansion of the Eurodollar market has been their use as
instruments of the international money market. 66 Financial
institutions are able to use the Eurodollar market just as they use the
traditional money market or the market for commercial paper. 67 As a
result, many Eurodollars are never actually lent out to nonbank
borrowers but are simply traded as commodities.6 8 Furthermore, this
action is not cabined to foreign loans; American banks can effectively
offer the same deal to their domestic customers through arbitrage.6 9

D. ExpandingBalance Sheets and ClearinghouseConcerns
The most common Eurodollar transactions are loans between
and among different banks, usually by way of intermediary banks. 70

In Citibank, N.A. v. Wells FargoAsia Ltd., the Singapore subsidiary
of Wells Fargo attempted to make a loan to the Manila subsidiary of
Citibank.7 1 In order to accomplish this, Wells Fargo in Singapore
transferred funds to Wells Fargo in New York, which made a loan to
Citibank in New York, which then transferred the funds to Citibank
in Manila.7 2

63.
Id.
64.
See id. (describing Eurodollars as directly competitive with more traditional
forms of financing).
65.
See Oscar L. Altman, Euro-Dollars: Some Further Comments, 12 IMF
STAFF PAPERS, Mar. 1965, at 1, 2-3 (describing situations in which borrowing dollars
and subsequently converting them to local currency might be economically preferable
to borrowing local currency directly).
66.
Edward J. Frydl, The Eurodollar Conundrum, FED. RESERVE BANK N.Y. Q.
REV., Spring 1982, at 11-12.
67.
Effros, supra note 7, at 635.
Id. at 636-37.
68.
Frydl, supra note 66, at 11.
69.
70.
See Citibank, N.A. v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd., 495 U.S. 660, 663 (1990)
(concerning a transaction between two foreign banks using banks in the United States
as intermediaries).
Id. at 664.
71.
Id.; cf. supraPart II.A.
72.
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New York plays an important role in these transactions as the
clearinghouse for interbank loans.7 3 This raises one of the initial
challenges of Eurodollar transactions: because New York is the
clearinghouse, whenever there are large overdrafts (as there
inevitably are in any large interbank transaction), it is up to the
Federal Reserve Bank to serve as the lender of last resort. 74 In other
words, the overnight window of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York is potentially implicated in every interbank Eurodollar
transaction.
Another principle consequence of the proliferation of Eurodollar
transactions is the expansion of balance sheets without an attendant
expansion of reserves in the United States.7 5 For example, if an
American bank transfers $1,000 to a foreign bank (FBi), the
American bank has $1,000 in new assets and FBI has $1,000 in new
liabilities. If that bank subsequently loans that $1,000 to another
bank (FB2) for lending to a customer, FBi now has an additional
$1,000 on the asset side of its balance sheet and FB2 has an
additional $1,000 in liabilities. Finally, FB2 lends to the customer
and gains $1,000 on the asset side of its balance sheet. In this
scenario, there has been no net quantitative change in the assets and
liabilities of the American bank, yet the balance sheets of the
European banks have expanded with each subsequent loan. 76 In
aggregate, a single $1,000 loan has increased total assets and
liabilities by $3,000, even though there is still ultimately only $1,000
in reserves backing these loans. As such, the financial system has
expanded simply by means of multiple transactions. This effect,
known as the credit multiplier,7 7 is particularly acute where reserve
requirements are lower and is a principle reason why the Eurodollar
market is so large.7 8

73.
Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 5, at 745.
74.
See id. (discussing the role of the Federal Reserve in Eurodollar
transactions).
75.
Effros, supra note 7, at 630; Greenberg, supra note 26, at 1494; see also
Effros, supra note 7, at 630-33 (describing transactions where the transfer of funds
expanded balance sheets without additional capital); Friedman, supra note 11, at 9
(demonstrating the expansion of balance sheets through Eurodollar transactions).
76.
Effros, supranote 7, at 630-31.
77.
Greenberg, supra note 26, at 1494-95. For a more accurate description of
the Eurodollar multiplier, see Friedman, supra note 11, at 9-10.
78.
TORBEN JUUL ANDERSEN, EUROMARKET INSTRUMENTS: A GUIDE TO THE
WORLD'S LARGEST DEBT MARKET 7 (1990). Torben Anderson and others suggest that
the credit multiplier might in fact be self-regulating, based on factors such as financial
institutions' "internal prudency measures." Id.; see also MEHTA & FUNG, supra note 36,
at 86 ("Although Eurobanks are not required to maintain reserves, they do maintain
prudent reserves (often in excess of mandatory reserves!)."). However, Guido Carli
called such presumptions "dangerous fallac[ies] both in theory ... and in practice."
Guido Carli, Eurodollars: Policy Analysis, in EURODOLLARS AND INTERNATIONAL
BANKING 139, 145 (Paolo Savona & George Sutija eds., 1985).
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Additional problems arise because foreign banks holding
Eurodollars are not subject to the regulations the U.S. Federal
Reserve imposes on domestic banks.7 9 Eurodollars are subject to
neither the Federal Reserve's reserve requirements nor the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation's insurance premiums that are
imposed on domestic banks with outstanding dollar liabilities.8 0 This
freedom from regulatory constraints is the "raison d'etre for the
Euromarket."8 It is, in large part, why foreign banks are able to
operate on narrower margins and offer favorable interest rates on
Eurodollar deposits and loans.8 2 However, it also means that the
Federal Reserve has no assurance of the stability of trillions of
dollars' worth of instruments that are ultimately supposed to be
backed by dollars.
E. The Eurodollarand Foreign Bank Bailouts
In late 2008, the Federal Reserve acted to unfreeze credit
markets and sure up the stability of the largest banks. The program
that garnered the most press and sparked the most outrage was the
expansion of the Federal Reserve's discount window to troubled
banks. European banks accounted for at least 70 percent of the
$110.7 billion borrowed during the peak of the program in late
2008.83 Even banks with very little presence in the United States
received huge loans: over the course of the program, the IrishGerman bank Depfa and the Belgian bank Dexia SA received
combined loans worth more than $60 billion. 84
However, the Federal Reserve completed a much larger and less
well-publicized foreign bank bailout during the financial crisis.
Through central bank liquidity swap lines, the Federal Reserve lent
$600 billion to banks all over the world.85 According to the Federal
Reserve, the extraordinary measures were justified by "severe strains

79.
CARBAUGH, supra note 8, at 531; Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 5,
at 743.
80.
Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 5, at 744.
81.
ANDERSEN, supra note 78, at 9.
82.
CARBAUGH, supranote 8, at 531; ANDERSEN, supranote 78, at 9-10.
Keoun & Torres, supra note 1.
83.
Gretchen Morgenson, The Bank Run We Knew So Little About, N.Y. TIMES,
84.
Apr. 2, 2011, § BU, at 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/03/business/
03gret.html [http://perma.cc/LUP5-3ZC8] (archived Feb. 14, 2014); Bob Ivry, Fed's
Biggest Foreign-Bank Bailout Kept U.S. Municipal Finance on Track, BLOOMBERG (Apr.
7, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.comInews/2011-04-06/fed-s-biggest-foreign-bank-bailout[http://perma.cc/794M-KU6V] (archived Feb.
kept-u-s-municipal-finance-on-track.html
14, 2014).
85.
See Liquidity Swap Chart, supra note 2 (showing $583,135,000 in liquidity
swaps held by the Federal Reserve during the week of December 17, 2008).
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in global short-term dollar funding markets." 86 In other words:
Eurodollars.
In the years leading up to the financial crisis, foreign banksespecially European banks-were attracted to Eurodollars because of
the low perceived risk and attractive returns of dollar-denominated
assets.8 7 Banks loaded their balance sheets with Eurodollar
liabilities.8 8 At the time of the crisis, the magnitude of foreign banks'
exposure to dollar-denominated instruments was enormous. By mid2007, the major European banks had a U.S. dollar funding gap of at
least $1.0-1.2 trillion and as possibly as high as $6.5 trillion.8 9 In the
precrisis economic environment, these large gaps had been funded by
interbank loans, borrowing from central banks, currency swaps, and
money market funds. 90
During the crisis, the sources that the banks had used to sustain
their dollar-funding gap dried up.91 Interbank funding slowed
because of risk and liquidity concerns; money market funds, facing
large redemptions following the failure of Lehman Brothers,
withdrew from bank-issued paper; and foreign central banks
withdrew their U.S. dollar reserves from commercial banks. 92 In
order to prevent a global run on financial institutions, the Federal
Reserve stepped in and made billions of U.S. dollars available to
foreign central banks, which then loaned them to commercial
institutions in their respective countries.9 3 Essentially, the Federal
Reserve became the lender of last resort for every major bank in the
world.94

86.
Regulatory Reform: Central Bank Liquidity Swap Lines, BD. OF GOVERNORS
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
SYs.,
RESERVE
FED.
OF
THE
reformswaplines.htm [http://perma.cc/S9DL-8GH8] (archived Feb. 14, 2014) (last
updated Aug. 2, 2013).
87.
Patrick McGuire & Gotz von Peter, The US Dollar Shortage in Global
Banking and the International Policy Response 1-2 (Bank for Int'l Settlements,
Working Paper No. 291, 2009).
88.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 15. The wide discrepancy between the upper and lower bounds of the
89.
funding gap is due to varying calculations of which dollar-denominated positions were
short term vs. long term. See id. (explaining differences in calculation methods and
results).
Id.
90.
Tyler Durden, How the Federal Reserve Bailed Out the World, ZERO HEDGE
91.
(Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.zerohedge.comlarticlelhow-federal-reserve-bailed-out-world
[http://perma.cc/8R4H-PACN] (archived Feb. 14, 2014).
92.
McGuire & von Peter, supra note 87, at 16-17.
See id. at 19-21 (describing the opening of swap lines).
93.
94.
Id. at 20. It is worth noting that foreign central banks also opened swap
lines with the Federal Reserve, making their currencies available to U.S. banks.
However, these lines were never actually tapped. See Credit and Liquidity Programs
and the Balance Sheet, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS.,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst.liquidityswaps.htm
[http://perma.cclXY9L-F5W3] (archived Feb. 14, 2014) (last updated Nov. 30, 2011)
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Moreover, during the Greek banking crisis in the spring of 2010,
the whole process repeated itself. In response to "the re-emergence of
strains in short-term dollar funding markets abroad," the Federal
Reserve reopened the swap lines.9 5 European banks borrowed over $9
billion from the Federal Reserve in 2010, and, as the Eurozone crisis
peaked in early 2012, the extension of dollar availability to foreign
banks topped $109 billion. 96

III.

STABILITY AND SOVEREIGNTY ISSUES

A. CentralBanks and Control
Eurodollars complicate Federal Reserve policy for a number of
reasons.97 The first is that such instruments engender growth of
dollar-denominated credit without a commensurate increase in the
conventionally defined money supply.9 8 In a very real sense then,
foreign banks create unsanctioned American money when they create
Eurodollars." Because Eurodollars are not subject to reserve
requirements, to the extent they can, banks are incentivized to shift
deposits from noninterest bearing reserves to Eurodollars. 0 0
Effectively this creates a very large pool of dollar-denominated assets
abroad ready to be lent out. According to the Bank of International
Settlement, a quarter of the U.S. dollar balance sheet is located
outside the United States.0lo This asset pool undermines the ability of
the United States to manage inflation by restricting its money supply,
because a large pool of dollar liquidity abroad is beyond the control of
the Federal Reserve.1 02
To the extent that the Federal Reserve is no longer in control of
the supply of dollars, the monetary sovereignty of the United States
is diluted. If foreign banks can lend dollars at unregulated interest

("Since their initial establishment in 2009, the Federal Reserve has not drawn on any
of the foreign-currency liquidity swap lines.").
95.
Regulatory Reform: Central Bank Liquidity Swap Lines, supra note 86;
Sewell Chan, Fed Intervenes in European Debt Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/10/business/global/lOswap.html
[http://perma.cc/X2JG-59S8] (archived Feb. 14, 2014).
96.
Liquidity Swap Chart,supra note 2.
97.
Frydl, supra note 66, at 12; see also Greenberg, supra note 26, at 1495
(explaining how the reserve requirements help the Federal Reserve control the money
supply and restrict inflation).
Frydl, supra note 66, at 12.
98.
See Morgan Ricks, A Simpler Approach to FinancialReform, REGULATION,
99.
Winter 2013-2014, at 36, 38 (discussing monetary sovereignty and comparing the
Eurodollar creation to overseas "counterfeiters of U.S. dollars").
Frydl, supra note 66, at 12.
100.
101.
He & McCauley, supra note 8, at 37.
102.
Frydl, supra note 66, at 12; Greenberg, supra note 26, at 1495; He &
McCauley, supra note 42, at 8.
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rates, then the interest rate set by the Federal Reserve is, at least to
some extent, made less effectual. Indeed, the Bank of International
Settlement has noted that it matters little whether a central bank
buys a U.S. Treasury note held in custody in the United States or one
held abroad.10 3 Generally speaking, arbitrageurs will take advantage
of differences in interest rates until returns on the various sources of
dollars are equalized.104 Nevertheless, the Federal Reserve's
prerogative to control the money supply and interest rate is
undermined by the alternative sources of dollars.
Under the concept of monetary sovereignty, "each country has
the exclusive authority to regulate every aspect of its currency,
including any factor that may affect it internally or externally."os As
an idea, monetary sovereignty predates political sovereignty. 10 6 While
it would be a stretch to call monetary sovereignty more important
than political sovereignty, such a comparison is ostensibly
meaningless: the two concepts are inextricably intertwined. As the
continuing crisis in the Eurozone demonstrates, running a modern
nation-state without the ability to control its monetary policy is a
difficult, perhaps impossible, task. 0 7
The principle way Eurocurrencies undermine monetary
sovereignty is demonstrated by the credit multiplier effect discussed
in Part II.D.ios Because Eurocurrencies give private financial
institutions the unrestricted ability to expand the availability of a
particular currency, the country whose currency is the target of the
Euroinstrument no longer has exclusive control over its money
supply. For example, the expansion of dollar-denominated credit
increases the availability of dollars and can result in inflation of the
dollar. 0 9 Furthermore, the lack of reserve requirements on

103.
Robert McCauley, Distinguishing Global Dollar Reserves from Official
Holdings in the United States, BIS Q. Rev., Sept. 2005, at 57, 59.
104.
Niall Coffey et al., Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., The Global FinancialCrisis
and Offshore DollarMarkets, 15 CURRENT ISSUES IN ECON. & FIN., Oct. 2009, at 3.
105.
Gloria Patricia Gaviria Blanco, Monetary Sovereignty and the Dollarization
of Latin-American Economies, CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J., Winter 2009, at 4 (Diana
M. Faraclas trans.).
106.
See Robert A. Mundell, Monetary Unions and the Problem of Sovereignty,
579 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. ScI. 123, 128 (2002) (tracing political sovereignty to
Jean Bodin in 1576 and monetary sovereignty to the Romans or even to "ancient
empires of Sumer, India, Babylon, and Egypt").
107.
The monetary crisis in the European Union is evidence that even partial
abrogation of monetary policy without an attendant delegation of political authority
can lead to tremendous difficulties. See Paul Krugman, Apocalypse Fairly Soon, N.Y.
TIMES
(May
17,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/18/opinion/krugmanapocalypse-fairly-soon.html?ref=paulkrugman [http://perma.cc/7ZHQ-LVJC] (archived
Feb. 16, 2014) (discussing the problems of monetary union without political union).
108.
See supra Part II.D.
109.
See Greenberg, supra note 26, at 1495 ("Inflation results when the
expansion process increases the supply of money, without a corresponding increase in
the production of goods and services."); EUGENE SARVER, THE EUROCURRENCY MARKET
HANDBOOK 447, 452 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing the reasons that Eurocurrencies can lead
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Eurodollars creates a potentially infinite money multiplier,
potentially leading to an infinite degree of inflation, all without the
input of the Federal Reserve or the U.S. Treasury. 110 Thus, the power
to control the number of dollars (or dollar-equivalent instruments) in
the market has been taken out of the exclusive control of U.S.
authority and diffused among foreign banking institutions.
While this is a distillation of a complicated process, the end
result is that-to a certain extent-the Federal Reserve's power to
control the money supply, and thus manage inflation, is undermined
by an alternate and potentially unlimited supply of dollars. Recently
this has not been a major concern because of very low inflation rates
since the recession."' However, in periods of high inflation, monetary
controls like increasing interest rates or purchasing treasuries are
less effective if there is an easy alternate source for dollars.112

B. Global FinancialStability: EurocurrenciesPose Systemic Risk
The Eurodollar market provides an alternate channel of
financing and interest rate premiums over dollar deposits in
American banks but has potentially dire consequences with respect to
world financial markets. Because foreign banks are not subject to
reserve requirements," 3 they can operate with large amounts of
leverage.11 4 Given the size of the Eurodollar market, overleveraged

to inflation). Eurocurrencies also increase the velocity of money. Id. at 452. This is a
concept that describes how fast a given unit of a particular currency travels through
the economy-i.e. how fast money is spent. See P.H. COLLIN, DICTIONARY OF
EcoNOMICS 212 (Kathy Rooney ed., 2003) (defining velocity of circulation).
110.
SARVER, supra note 109, at 452. But see Friedman, supra note 11, at 10
(arguing that the multiplier is naturally limited "because only a small part of the funds
acquired by borrowers from Euro-dollar banks would end up as additional time
deposits in such banks").
111.
See
U.S.
Inflation,
FED.
RESERVE
BANK
OF
CLEVELAND,
http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/data/us-inflation/chartsdatal
[http://perma.cc/
ES32-NYZH] (archived Feb. 16, 2014) (last visited Feb. 28, 2014) (chart showing the
Consumer Price Index); Jim Tankersley, No, Inflation Still Isn't a Problem, WASH.
POST WONKBLOG, (Jan. 16, 2013, 9:38 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/16/no-inflation-still-isnt-a-problem/
[http://perma.cc/DB97PNW5] (archived Feb. 16, 2014) (reporting that consumer prices were unchanged in
December 2012); Economy Ended the Year with Factory Output Up and Inflation Low,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/17/business/economy/
consumer-prices-unchanged-in-december.html [http://perma.cc/4QEL-TVW9] (archived
Feb. 16, 2014] (noting low inflation in 2012).
112.
Fred H. Klopstock, The Euro-Dollar Market: Some Unresolved Issues,
ESSAYS IN INT'L FIN., Mar. 1968, at 1, 20; see SARVER, supra note 109, at 452
(describing the absence of reserve requirements for Eurodollars).
113.
E.g., Frydl, supra note 66, at 12.
114.
"Leverage" refers to the amount of borrowed money that banks invest in
order to turn a profit. FITCH, supra note 56, at 263.
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Eurodollar lenders threaten global financial stability. 115 For example,
the financial crisis of 2007 started in the housing market, but the
housing bubble simply revealed that the underlying infirmities with
the financial system were overleveraged banks and a lack of
liquidity. 1 6 These two factors were the principle source of the credit
crunch.
Due to the sheer size of the Eurodollar market, widespread
default could send the world economy into recession. This risk stems
from the high degree of integration in interbank markets.117 If a
particularly important bank or series of banks in the Eurodollar
market were to fail, the resulting contagion could trigger a domino
effect resulting in the failure of the global market.11 8 Eurodollars
have the potential to export what, in a less integrated market, would
be damaging only to a single country or sector. Thus, a run on a
single currency could trigger bank runs around the world." 9
Given these risks, the lack of regulation of Eurodollars is
particularly startling. Of the five major centers of Eurocurrency
transactions, all five either have ways to effectively eliminate reserve
requirements on Eurocurrencies or lack such requirements
entirely.120 New York and London are the largest of these centers,
and neither the Bank of England nor the Federal Reserve has reserve
requirements on Eurocurrency deposits.' 2 ' The Cayman Islands, a
favorite offshore location for shell branches of U.S. banks, similarly
lacks reserve requirements. 122

115.
See Greenberg, supra note 26, at 1504 ("Even though the Eurodollar
market has survived and grown for over two decades, there remains a serious risk of a
substantial economic upheaval if the market were to undergo severe strains.").
116.
See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT, at xix (Official Government ed. Jan. 2011) (noting 40-to-1 leverage ratios of
the large banks).
117.
See Greenberg, supra note 26, at 1502 (discussing the integration of
financial institutions in the Eurodollar market).
118.
Id.; MEHTA & FUNG, supra note 36, at 87; see Effros, supra note 7, at 644
(questioning the safety of Eurodollar chains).
119.
See Greenberg, supra note 26, at 1501 (discussing liquidity problems in the
event of a large number of withdrawals of deposits, especially when banks borrow short
and lend long); see also Ricks, A Former Treasury Adviser on How to Really Fix Wall
Street, supra note 5 (discussing the desirability of "terming out").
120.
MEHTA & FUNG, supra note 36, at 87. The five major Eurocurrency centers
are: Western Europe (mostly London), the Caribbean and Central America (especially
the Cayman Islands), the Middle East, Asia (Tokyo, Singapore, and Hong Kong), and
the United States (mostly New York).
121.
Id.; Reserve Requirements, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYs.,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/reservereq.htm
[http://perma.cc/PTS3BVCL] (archived Feb. 16, 2014) (last updated Oct. 26, 2012).
122.
MEHTA & FUNG, supra note 36, at 87.
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IV. INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY REGIMES: BRETTON WOODS
AND THE BASEL ACCORDS

A. InternationalMonetary Agreements: From Bretton Woods
to Basel II
International agreements seeking to regulate financial markets
have been successful in a variety of contexts. The first of these
modern agreements, and perhaps the most famous, is the "Bretton
Woods system," which came into existence during the Second World
War.123 In 1944, forty-four nations agreed to an international basis
for currency exchange, which helped pave the way for the U.S.financed reconstruction of Europe after the war.124 The agreement
essentially consisted of countries fixing their respective currencies to
the dollar, which was itself fixed to the price of gold.' 25 The system,
named for Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, where the conference was
held, also led to the creation of the International Monetary Fund and
the World Bank.126 The fixed exchange rate system established at
Bretton Woods lasted until the 1970s when President Nixon pulled
the dollar off the gold standard, resulting in many of the signatory
nations allowing their currencies to have floating exchange rates. 127
Since Bretton Woods, the most important international
monetary agreements have been signed in Basel, Switzerland. Right
around the time that the Bretton Woods system was failing, a
confluence of additional economic factors prompted the G-10 nations
to take further action to regulate international markets. 128 The cut in
oil production by the Arab states during the Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur
War in October 1973 and the June 1974 failure of the West German
bank Bankhaus Herstatt resulted in significant disturbances in
international currency and banking markets.129 The drastic
consequences of the failure of the bank Bankhaus Herstatt in
Cologne, Germany, were particularly alarming. Although the bank

123.
M.J. Stephey, A Brief History of Bretton Woods System, TIME (Oct. 21, 2008),
http://www.time.com/timelbusiness/article/0,8599,1852254,00.html
[http://perma.cc/L6LY-258Q] (archived Feb. 16, 2014).
124.
Id.
125.
Id.
126.
Id.
127.
Milestones: 1937-1945, Bretton Woods-GATT- 1941-1947, U.S. DEP'T OF
THE
HISTORIAN,
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1937STATE,
OFFICE OF
1945/BrettonWoods [http://perma.cc/YRA8-62VZ] (archived Feb. 16, 2014) (last visited
Mar. 1, 2014).
128.
BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION,
HISTORY OF THE BASEL COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERSHIP 1 (Aug. 2009).
Christopher Alessi, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, COUNCIL
129.
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (July 11, 2012), http://www.cfr.org/banks-and-bankingIbaselcommittee-banking-supervision/p28694 [http://perma.cc/9W8D-PH9X] (archived Feb.
14, 2014).
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was very small, due to its extensive foreign exchange dealings, the
consequences of its failure rippled across the globe.13 0 As a result, the
G-10 gathered in Basel and formed the Committee on Banking
Regulations and Supervisory Practices (Basel Committee)'13 whose
purpose was to improve the quality of bank supervision around the
world.' 32
While the Basel Committee lacked formal supervisory authority,
its creation led to a multitude of substantive reforms.' 33 Its purpose is
to formulate "broad supervisory standards and guidelines and [to]
recommend[] statements of best practice in the expectation that
individual authorities will take steps to implement them through
detailed arrangements-statutory or otherwise-which are best
suited to their own national systems."134 Through this committee
participating nations have negotiated a series of agreements known
collectively as the Basel Accords. 13 5
In 1988, the Basel Committee agreed to the Basel Capital
Accord, often referred to as Basel I, which was intended to address
the capital adequacy at large international banks.' 3 6 This was
motivated both out of a concern for stability, as noted above, and
international competitiveness.13 7 Different nations had different
capital requirements for their banking institutions, and the hope was
that a uniform system would both shore up risk and create
international competitive equality.' 3 8 Accordingly, the Basel
Committee adopted a uniform system of capital requirements for
banks.' 39
A capital adequacy ratio, or capital requirement, is "an amount
of money which a bank has to have in the form of shareholders'
capital, shown as a percentage of its assets." 140 In other words, the
amount of capital a bank has in relation to its risky assets.141 The

130.
Marc Levinson, Faulty Basel: Why More Diplomacy Won't Keep the
Financial System Safe, 89 FOREIGN AFF., May-June 2010, at 77-78.
131.
The committee was subsequently renamed the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision. Id. at 78.
132.
Alessi, supra note 129.
133.

See HISTORY OF THE BASEL COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERSHIP, supra note

128, at 1 ("The Committee does not possess any formal supranational supervisory
authority.").
134.
Id. at 1.
135.
See id. at 2-6 (discussing accords reached in the 1980s and 1990s).
Id.
136.
137.

Id.

138.
Id.
139.
Alessi, supra note 129.
140.
COLLIN, supra note 109, at 25.
141.
One of the principle goals of the Basel Accords is to define, precisely, what
constitutes "capital" for the purposes of bank regulation. See infra notes 140-43 and
accompanying text. However, broadly defined, capital includes traditional equity and
surplus as well as other assets of a bank. Michael P. Malloy, U.S. International
Banking and the New Capital Adequacy Requirements: New, Old and Unexpected, 7
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method of calculating these ratios was provided for in various
appendices to Basel L142
The G-10 project was not a static one; efforts at greater
protection continued to evolve as markets became more
sophisticated. 143 The original Basil Accord was updated in 1998 to
include capital requirements for "the market risks arising from
banks' open positions in foreign exchange, traded debt securities,
equities, commodities and options."144 However, even under this
amendment, banks were allowed to use internal models, subject to
regulatory standards, for measuring the market risk for capital
requirements.145 Furthermore, the increasing use of innovative
financial instruments represented another gap in the existing
framework.1 46
Recognizing the shortcomings of Basel I, in the late 1990s and
early 2000s, the Basel Committee investigated a new capital
framework to address the gaps in their efforts to bolster bank
stability.147 Approved in June 2004, the New Capital Framework,
known as Basel II, divided banking regulation into three "pillars:"
minimum capital requirements, supervisory review, and market
discipline.148 The first pillar sought to expand on the 1988 Basel
Accord, making capital requirements more risk sensitive. The second
pillar was intended to increase regulatory supervision of financial
intuitions' risk management and capital adequacy. The third pillar
was intended to use disclosure and market forces to pressure banks to
behave more prudently. 49

ANN. REV. BANKING L. 75, 75 n.1 (1988). For example, in its definition of capital, the
Office of Thrift Supervision includes: "(i) Common stockholders' equity (including
retained earnings); (ii) Noncumulative perpetual preferred stock and related surplus;
(iii) Minority interests in the equity accounts of the subsidiaries that are fully
consolidated .... ; (iv) Nonwithdrawable accounts and pledged deposits of mutual
savings associations . .. ;[and] (v) The remaining goodwill . .. resulting from prior
regulatory accounting practices ..... 12 C.F.R. § 567.5 (2010) (footnotes omitted).
142.
BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION,
INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS 8

(July 1988); see id. at 17-18 (Annex 2 describing "risk weights by category of onbalance-sheet asset").
143.

See HISTORY OF THE BASEL COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERSHIP, supra note

128, at 3 ("The new Framework is designed ... to better address the financial
innovation that has occurred in recent years . . .
144.
145.

Id.
Id.

146.

Id.

Id.
147.
148.
Id.; BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS,
BASEL COMM. ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL
STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK f 4 (June 2004).
149.
HISTORY OF THE BASEL COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERSHIP, supra note 128,

at 3; Levinson, supra note 130, at 80-81.
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B. Basel Failures
Despite the best efforts of the Basel Committee and the
participating nations, Basel II failed to prevent the global financial
crisis and thus proved woefully inadequate as a comprehensive
regulatory framework. The crisis exposed many of the shortcomings
of the agreement. Among the faults with Basel II were:
implementation failures,o5 0 the lack of control extending to entities
that conduct business across borders,' 5 ' the lack of rules dictating
minimum liquidity,152 and the inadequacy of provisions geared
toward the regulation of derivatives. 5 3 Implementation failures are
inherent in any nonbinding multinational agreement.154 The Basel
Accords, like any multinational agreements, are only effective insofar
as they achieve actual compliance from banks.
Relatedly, the effectiveness of the third pillar of Basel I-the
use of market forces to reign in leverage-was called into question by
the realities of the financial crisis. Before the crash, investors favored
institutions with riskier portfolios, incentivizing banks to increase
risk. 5 5 Given this experience, it is unlikely that self-policing will be
effective in managing large scale risk such as that posed by the
Eurodollar market; regulatory solutions must be imposed by
nonmarket actors.
The next two problems, the gaps in oversight of transnational
trading and the regulation of derivatives, both have direct bearing on
the Eurocurrency market. The lack of oversight for large-scale, crossborder transactions means instruments like Eurocurrencies are
essentially unregulated. Generally speaking, the regulator in charge
of imposing rules on any particular financial institution is the

150.
HISTORY OF THE BASEL COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERSHIP, supra note 128,
at 3-4.
151.
Levinson, supra note 130, at 83.
152.
Id. at 81-82. Liquidity is an entity's ability to marshal resources. Cash is
the most liquid asset. Securities are generally considered illiquid.
153.
See CME GROUP, CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS IN A BRAVE NEW WORLD 7 (2012)
(discussing the lack of capital requirements for exchange traded derivatives under
Basel I and Basel II.)
154.
See, e.g., U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Status of
Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, available at http://unfccc.int/kyotoprotocoll
status of ratification/items/2613.php [http://perma.cc/77CZ-WXTF] (archived Feb. 14,
2014) (chart showing that the United States, a major emitter of greenhouse gas, has
not ratified the treaty).
155.
Levinson, supra note 130, at 83; see Dominic Crossley-Holland, Lehman
Brothers, The Bank That Bust the Boom, THE TELEGRAPH (Sept. 6, 2009),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/6143297/LehmanBrothers-the-bank-that-bust-the-boom.html, [http://perma.cclKG3D-N7AW] (archived
Feb. 16, 2014) (noting that Lehman Brothers share price rose from $4 in 1994 to $82 in
2007 and that the bank's leverage ratio may have reached as high as 44-to-1 before the
crash).
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government of the country where that institution is based.15 6 This
practice, known as home country regulation, is insufficient protection
in situations where the risks created by the practices of one financial
institution are borne by the economies and financial institutions of
other countries.15 7 For example, the failure of Icelandic banks led to
losses by depositors in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom and
had ripple effects on the global economy,' 5 8 but the Icelandic
government was not accountable to the citizens of those foreign
nations. Thus, the Icelandic government did not face political
pressure to either satisfy the claims of foreign depositors nor to enact
safeguards in proportion to the multinational risk posed by their
national institutions.15 9
The Lehman Brothers collapse reveals another failure of home
country regulation. Lehman Brothers was subject to both U.S. and
U.K. regulators and posed systemic risk to both countries' financial
systems.160 However, in September 2008 neither country mustered
the political will to bailout the failing bank, hoping the other country
might take on the risk of the bad assets, resulting in a "free rider"
problem.161 Furthermore, after the bankruptcy, creditors on both
sides of the Atlantic were competing for priority in collecting their
debts.162 The American venue of the bankruptcy proceedings may
have allowed the Federal Reserve to recover its investments before
creditors-both foreign and domestic-who legally had priority.163
It is precisely such free rider problems that are posed by several
aspects of the Eurodollar market. First, because the reserve bank of
the clearinghouse location is the lender of last resort in Eurocurrency
transactions, banks that are not subject to the regulations or reserve
requirements of that reserve bank are still eligible for discount
window loans.164 Next, foreign banks that borrow Eurodollars from
other foreign banks could conceivably have large Eurodollar balances
without having any branch in the United States, thus having no

156.
Levinson, supra note 130, at 83-84.
157.
Id. at 84.
158.
See id. at 84 ("[T]he Icelandic government refused to repay Dutch and
British depositors.").
159.
See id. ("Iceland's citizens rejected a plan to make the [foreign] depositors
whole.").
Id.
160.
Id.
161.
162.
E.g., Jonathan D. Glater & Gretchen Morgenson, Lehman Creditors
Scramble for Position, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com
2008/09/16/business/worldbusiness/16iht-bankruptcy.4.16202470.html?pagewanted=all
&_r=0 [http://perma.ce/8BYD-CC2C] (archived Feb. 16, 2014).
163.
See Jeffrey McCracken & Mike Spector, Fed Draws Court's Eyes in Lehman
Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 5, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12544389
1097957691.html [http://perma.cc/XY6J-X7VQI (archived Feb. 16, 2014) (describing the
possibility that the Federal Reserve may have gotten preferential treatment over other
creditors during the Lehman Bankruptcy).
164.
STIGUM, supra note 20, at 286; see supra Part II.D.
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connection with the American regulatory scheme. 16 5 Such banks
would thus hold large Eurodollar liabilities on their balance sheets
without being subject to any financial controls.
Finally, and perhaps more consequentially given the
circumstances leading to the financial crisis, Basel I and Basel I
failed to address the risk posed by the lack of liquidity of major
financial institutions. 16 6 Even institutions with sufficient capital
could not meet immediate cash needs because of the freezing of the
credit markets.' 6 7 Even if an institution is sufficiently capitalized,
large Eurodollar obligations can undermine liquidity because foreign
banks do not normally have access to the Federal Reserve discount
window, yet have dollar-denominated obligations.
C. Basel III: Another Half-measure
In response to the financial crisis, the Basel Committee proposed
additional reforms at the end of 2010.168 Implementation of this third
agreement, known as Basel III, began at the beginning of 2013.169
Like Basel II, the new agreement further increases banks' capital
requirements, but unlike the previous accords, Basel III also imposes
liquidity requirements on banks. According to the president of the
Basel Committee, the hope is that "higher levels of capital, combined
with a global liquidity framework, will significantly reduce the
probability and severity of banking crises in the future."1 7 o
Basel III fills several of the holes of the previous agreements but
is an evolution rather than an overhaul of the system. First, the new
agreement requires an increase of the minimum capital adequacy
ratio.'7 1 Other gaps the new regime attempts to fill reflect some of the
165.
For example, "FB2" in the example provided supra Part II.D.
166.
Claire Jones, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, FIN. TIMES
(Oct. 23, 2011), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/3e5af5f6-fb51-1leO-8df6-00144feab
49a.html#axzzlzDOG2dPu [http://perma.cc/3B76-GN4J] (archived Feb. 16, 2014) (book
review); see BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION,

BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND
BANKING SYSTEMS J 1-4 (Dec. 2010) (rev. June 2011) [hereinafter BASEL III]
(discussing the rationale behind the adoption of Basel III).
Levinson, supra note 130, at 81.
167.
168.
See id. at 86 (noting potential regulations as part of a new framework).
169.
Press Release, Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Implementation of
the Basel III Framework (Dec. 14, 2012), available at http://www.bis.org/press/
p121 2 14a.htm [http://perma.cclA4Y4-8DEJ] (archived Feb. 14, 2014).
Press Release, Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Basel III Rules Text
170.
and Results of the Quantitative Impact Study Issued by the Basel Committee (Dec. 16,
2012), available at http://www.bis.org/press/p101216.htm [http://perma.cc/K2M5-EB4T]
(archived Feb. 14, 2014).
BASEL III, supra note 166, T 94. Specifically, new capital requirements will
171.
be phased in over the course of three years: Tier 1 requirements rose to 4.5 percent in
January 2013, will rise to 5.5 percent in January 2014, and finally to 6 percent in
January 2015. Id. Previous Tier 2 ratios remain unchanged at 8 percent under Basel
III. Press Release, Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Group of Governors and
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principle themes of the financial crisis. Basel III implements a new
scheme for monitoring banks' leverage ratios 17 2 and adds financial
instruments such as derivatives and other "off balance sheet" items
into the calculus for determining capital adequacy and risk
assessment. 7 3
However, the major innovation in Basel III is the adoption of new
standards to govern banks' short- and long-term minimum
liquidity. 174 These liquidity ratios are distinct from the capital
adequacy ratios found in the previous two agreements. 175 Liquidity
requirements dictate the amount of liquid assets banks must have
relative to their total assets. 176
Basel III imposes two distinct liquidity standards. The first of
these ratios, called the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), is intended "to
promote short-term resilience of a bank's liquidity risk profile by
ensuring that it has sufficient high quality liquid resources to survive
an acute stress scenario lasting for one month."1 77 The LCR is a ratio
of highly liquid assets in relation to possible short-term outflows
(short-term debt). It dictates the amount of liquid assets that a bank
must maintain in order to survive a liquidity crisis-i.e. bank runslasting thirty days. The longer-term ratio, the net stable funding
ratio, "has a time horizon of one year and has been developed to
provide a sustainable maturity structure of assets and liabilities." 7 8
Ostensibly, this is the same idea applied over the course of a year: it
dictates the percent of a bank's assets that must be liquid enough for
the bank to survive a run in the case of a yearlong liquidity crisis.
These liquidity ratios are important innovations because they
seek to mitigate short-term liquidity crises in global markets like the
one that precipitated the recent financial crisis.1 79 During the initial
phase of the crisis, even banks that had adequate capital faced
difficulties because they did not have assets that were readily
convertible to cash.18 0 The LCR' 8 seeks to mitigate such crises by

Heads of Supervision Announces Higher Global Minimum Capital Standards (Sept. 12,
2010), www.bis.org/press/pl00912.htm [http://perma.cc/AH5A-XW8E] (archived Feb.
17, 2014).
172.
BASEL III, supra note 166, 1 151.
173.
Id.
12-13.
174.
Id.
34, 37.
175.
Id.
176.
See BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, BASEL III: THE LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO AND LIQUIDITY RISK
MONITORING TOOLS 1-2 (Jan. 2013), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.htm
[http://perma.cc/9R7E-WQNT] (archived Feb. 17, 2014) [hereinafter LCR FRAMEWORK]
(noting that the main goal of the LCR is to ensure that banks have an adequate stock
of highly liquid assets).
177.
BASEL III, supra note 166, 38.
178.
Id.
179.
LCR FRAMEWORK, supra note 176, 1$ 1-2.
Id.
180.
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requiring the bank maintain enough "high quality liquid assets"
(HQLA)1 82 to cover net cash outflows during any 30 day period of
market stress.'8 3 Among the assets that count as HQLA are cash,
central bank reserves and debt, certain marketable securities, certain
corporate securities, and other commodities.1 84 Net cash outflows are
calculated by subtracting a bank's expected inflows generated by
lending and other dealings from outflows generated by deposits and
other funding.185
Furthermore, the calculus of the LCR does take into account the
potential that banks might hold assets in denominations of foreign
currencies. According to the Basel Committee, "[w]hile the LCR is
expected to be met and reported in a single currency, banks are
expected to be able to meet their liquidity needs in each currency and
maintain HQLA consistent with the distribution of their liquidity
needs by currency."186 Foreign banks are required to hold HQLA in to
accommodate net cash outflows in each currency and jurisdiction they
have obligations.' 8 7 Additionally, the framework forces banks to hold
a higher proportion of HQLA in foreign currencies to account for
foreign exchange risk.' 8 8
Despite all of the sensible inclusions in Basel III, it does not
adequately address the risks posed by the Eurodollar. The focus of
Basel III, like its predecessors, has been on maintaining the health of
financial institutions. The stated mission of the Basel Committee is to
"enhanc[e] financial stability" by achieving "prudential regulation"
and supervision of banks around the world.' 89 However, the
Eurodollar market is only indirectly affected by general liquidity and
capital requirements. The risks posed by the proliferation of
Eurodollars have as much to do with monetary sovereignty as bank
181.
As the Basil Committee has released guidance only on the LCR, this
discussion is similarly focused on only this liquidity ratio.
182.
There are seven characteristics of high quality liquid assets. Four are
"fundamental characteristics," (1) low risk, (2) ease and certainty of valuation, (3) low
correlation with risky assets, (4) listed on a developed and recognized exchange, and
three are "market-related characteristics," (5) an active and sizable market for the
asset, (6) low volatility, and (6) flight to quality. LCR FRAMEWORK, supra note 176,
24.
183.
Id.
22. The Basel Committee expresses LCR as, "Stock of HQLA/Total net
cash outflows over the next 30 calendar days 2 100%." Id.
184.
See id. at Annex 4 (listing items that qualify as HQLA and their weights for
purposes of LCR calculation).
185.
Id.
69; see id. at Annex 4 (listing categories of cash inflows and cash
outflows and their weights for purposes of LCR calculation).
186.
Id.
24; see id. 1 173 ("As indicated in the LCR, the currencies of the stock
of HQLA should be similar in composition to the operational needs of the bank.").
187.
Id. 1 24.
188.
Id. 1 60 (noting that major currencies that are active in global foreign
exchange markets are subject to a minimum haircut of 8 percent); see id.
81
(describing treatment of foreign currency retail deposits).
189.
BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION
CHARTER 1 1. (Jan. 2013).
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stability. The Basel Accords simply do not account for these
sovereignty issues. At best, then, the Basel Accords represent halfmeasures to the structural risks presented by the Eurodollar market.

V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

A. Introduction:Action vs. Inaction
The three possible responses to the current state of the
Eurodollar market are: country-level controls, international
regulations, and inaction. The regulatory options, whether in the
form of unilateral controls imposed by the United States, or an
international agreement, should attempt to control the size of the
Eurodollar market. Unilateral action is easier to implement but may
be less effective given the global nature of the financial system.190
Conversely, an international approach might be more effective but
would require the cooperation of the international community. The
final option is inaction.19 After all, "[tihe mere presence of
risk . . . does not require a full-fledged regulatory response."192
Nevertheless, the most prudent course of action is an international
regulatory scheme.

190.
Compare Robert M. Morgenthau, These Islands Aren't Just a Shelter from
Taxes, N.Y. Times (May 5, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/06/opinion/sunday/
these-islands-arent-just-a-shelter-from-taxes.html [http://perma.cc/K5SG-34BH] (archived
Feb. 17, 2014) (describing the use of offshore shelters to circumvent tax laws, hide
financial fraud, and fund rouge actors), and Charles Duhigg & David Kocieniewski,
How Apple Sidesteps Billions in Taxes, N.Y. Times (Apr. 28, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/business/apples-tax-strategy-aims-at-low-taxstates-and-nations.html [http://perma.cc/FZW7-B5VN] (archived Feb. 17, 2014)
(describing the use of an accounting technique called a "Double Irish With a Dutch
Sandwich," which helped Apple, Inc. avoid $2.4 billion in taxes in 2011), with
Katharina Bart & Oliver Hirt, Swiss Banks Agree to U.S. Tax Deal, More Expected to
Follow, Reuters (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/10/us-taxswitzerland-idUSBRE9B80S320131210 [http://perma.cc/4JHV-UHTF] (archived Feb.
17, 2014) (outlining an agreement between U.S. authorities and Swiss banks enabling
a crackdown on tax cheats).
191.
Milton Friedman, perhaps unsurprisingly, argued that regulation was not
required in the Eurodollar market because banks would naturally keep prudent
reserves, and the potential multiplier would not pose any risk to the financial system.
See Friedman, supra note 11, at 18, 21. The financial crisis provides reason to believe
that at least the former of those two assumptions may not be correct. See FIN. CRISIS
INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 116, at xix (noting 40-to-1 leverage ratios of the large
banks).
192.
Greenberg, supra note 26, at 1504.
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B. UnilateralAction
1.

Unilateral Elimination of the Eurodollar

Theoretically, the United States could prohibit the creation of
Eurodollars. This was the approach taken by the United Kingdom
after the Second World War' 9 s and by the Japanese through the mid1980s. 194 By means of the Exchange Control Act of 1947, the United
Kingdom prohibited residents from exporting domestic assets without
first securing permission from the treasury and required
nonresidents to secure permission in order to operate sterlingdenominated bank accounts.19 5 Additionally, residents were not
allowed to lend sterling deposits on the Eurosterling market without
permission of the Bank of England, which was rarely granted. 9 6
Finally, the exchange controls forbade residents from holding foreign
currency bank deposits.19 7 The aggregate effect of these restrictions
was to limit the growth of the Eurosterling market.1 9 8
While the United States would be able to control the market
simply by virtue of its elimination, such an uncompromising approach
poses significant obstacles. Given the current degree of integration of
global markets, it is doubtful that this approach is feasible. First, it
would be very costly and take years to accomplish.' 9 9 Second, it is an
isolationist action in an increasingly interdependent world. 200
Finally, a ban might have wide-ranging unintended consequences. 201
Eurodollars represent an important source of financing and credit;

193.

See HEATHER D.

GIBSON, THE EUROCURRENCY MARKETS,

FINANCIAL POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL INSTABILITY

90-92

DOMESTIC

(1989) (discussing the

Exchange Control Act of 1947).
194.
MEHTA & FUNG, supra note 36, at 82.
195.
GIBSON, supra note 193, at 91.
196.
Id. at 92.
197.
Id. at 94.
198.
Id. at 92. Note, however, that nonresidents were allowed to use the London
market to hold foreign currency in London banks. This meant that while the Bank of
England was restricting the growth of the Eurosterling market, it was facilitating the
growth of the Eurodollar market. Id.; see supra Part II.B (discussing the growth of the
Eurodollar market in London).
199.
See Greenberg, supra note 26, at 1507 (discussing costs of regulation). For the
sake of comparison, it took three and a half years for Lehman Brothers to go through
bankruptcy, and will not finish liquidating its assets until 2017. Nick Summers, Welcome
to Lehman Brothers. We're Open for Business, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 21,
2012),
http://www.businessweek.comlarticles/2012-09-21/welcome-to-lehman-brothersdot-were-open-for-business [http://perma.ce/3MX2-JSK7] (archived Mar. 1, 2014). The
debt obligations of a single bank, even a large one, are orders of magnitude smaller than
the entire Eurocurrency market. For example, the debt obligations of Goldman Sachs are
in the billions rather than trillions. See The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.: Key Statistics,
YAHOO FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/ qlks?s=GS+Key+Statistics (last visited Mar.
18, 2014).

200.
201.

Greenberg, supra note 26, at 1506.
See id. at 1504 (discussing the costs of regulation).

2014]1

THE MONETARY FIFTH COLUMN

853

the disruption of a $5 trillion credit market might lead to a global
credit crisis, one of the principle evils that regulation -is trying to
prevent. 202
Moreover, past examples are inappropriate models for the
contemporary market. Unlike the pound in the first half of the
twentieth century or yen in the 1980s, the dollar is the world's
reserve currency. 20 3 The market for Eurodollars is huge and already a
major instrument of global trade. 204 The example of the United
Kingdom represents an ex ante solution because the British were not
attempting to unwind an existing market. 205 The Eurodollar market
is an ex post problem. Finally, early controls imposed by the United
Kingdom stem from an era before the collapse of the gold standard
and are inapposite given the current state of the global monetary
system.
2.

Host Country Regulation

A possible solution to the problems caused by home country
regulation is, paradoxically, a variation of home country regulation.
Host country regulation, the approach advocated by Marc Levinson,
involves "each country taking responsibility for regulating the
financial institutions that operate within its borders, no matter where
they are based." 206 The United States could unilaterally impose its
own system of reserve requirements on American institutions that
are heavily involved in the Eurodollar market, in addition to the
imposition of reserve requirements to secure Eurodollar liabilities
held by the U.S. branches of foreign banks. This approach is similar
to that of the Basel Accords but is enacted at a national rather than
supranational level.
Such a system has several advantages. First, tighter restrictions
imposed by the United States would be subject only to U.S.
government policy rather than international agreements. Next, these
regulations would extend to a much larger number of financial
institutions because it would encompass banks that have branches or
operations in the United States rather than simply being based here.
This would presumably give U.S. authorities purview over a greater

202.
See Ricks, supra note 99, at 3 ("It is sometimes suggested that securities
dealers and other nonbank financial firms 'need' to fund short-that they somehow
cannot conduct their businesses without short-term wholesale funding.").
See Francesco Guerrera, The Dollar Is Still King, For Now, WALL ST. J.
203.
(Nov. 5, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702033471045781008723
05029246.html [http://perma.cc/LKZ-57JQ] (archived Feb. 28, 2013) ("[M]ore than 60%
of foreign-exchange reserves are in dollars.").
See He & McCauley, supra note 42, at 2-3 (discussing the dollar's
204.
"dominant position" in international finance).
Cf. supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
205.
206.
Levinson, supra note 130, at 87.
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share of the Eurodollar market. Finally, if the United States were to
set a baseline of regulatory controls, other G-10 countries might be
encouraged to follow suit. 207
3.

Shortcomings of Unilateral Regulation

Unilateral regulation of an international market has inherent
drawbacks, regardless of whether the method pursued is home
country regulation or host country regulation. One of the main
problems with unilateral requirements is the likelihood that deposits
would be driven into foreign banks.2 08 If the Federal Reserve acted
independently to increase reserve requirements for Eurodollar
liabilities, other banking centers would be at a competitive
advantage. 209 The market risks would remain, but the capital would
simply be driven into foreign institutions. This was precisely what
spurred the initial growth of the Eurodollar market in the 1950s and
1960s. 210 Furthermore, such competitive disparities are among the
problems that the Basel Committee was created to prevent.2 11
The effectiveness of unilaterally imposed reserve requirements
would also depend on further regulation to split the onshore and
offshore money markets. 212 Otherwise, foreign investors would be
able to deal in "foreign exchange contracts that embody the difference
between domestic and [offshore] money rates," which would simply
encourage arbitrage and further movement of funds to offshore
banks. 213
Additionally, there is the problem of preexisting dollars owned
by foreign nations and foreign banks without operations in the United
States. 2 14 Because the U.S. dollar is the world reserve currency,
foreign nations own significant reserves of dollars. 215 Thus, there is

207.
See Stavros Gadinis, The Politics of Competition in InternationalFinancial
Regulation, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 447, 456 (2008) (explaining that race to the top
scenarios occur when regulations promote efficiency).
See Frydl, supra note 66, at 15; Gadinis, supra note 202, at 456 n.31
208.
(explaining that race to the bottom scenarios occur when "increased compliance costs
do not correspond to the additional protection ensured").
209.
See GIBSON, supra note 193, at 215 (noting the difficulty of competing in
international credit markets in the face of regulation).
210.
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
211.
HISTORY OF THE BASEL COMM. AND ITS MEMBERSHIP, supra note 128, at 1;
see supra Part TV.A.
212.
He & McCauley, supra note 42, at 11.
213.
Id. at 11-12.
214.
Greenberg, supra note 26, at 1507.
215.
Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER),
FUND,
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/cofer/eng/index.htm
INT'L
MONETARY
[http://perma.cc/4TNM-WF3M] (archived Feb. 17, 2014) (last updated Dec. 30, 2013)
(showing that U.S. dollars represented 61.4 percent of foreign exchange reserves in the
third quarter of 2013 for a total of $3,803,731,000,000); Bill Conerly, Future of the
Dollar as World Reserve Currency, FORBES STRATEGIES BLOG (Oct. 25, 2013, 12:27 PM),
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the risk that a unilateral effort by the United States to control the
overseas trade of dollars would be ineffective.2 16
Finally, in 1979 Congress tried and failed to enact unilateral
regulation on the Eurodollar. 217 While this has no bearing on whether
regulation would fail today, the huge competitive disadvantage that
unilateral controls would place on the domestic banking industry
suggests that there would be strong opposition to such a proposal.
The banking industry vigorously opposed simple risk management
rules like Basel I1218 and the "Volcker Rule."2 19 A proposal splitting
American banks from the offshore money market means the
transformation, or even destruction, of an entire industry. It stands to
reason that New York, a global banking center, would likely oppose a
measure that cut it off from currency markets. It would also
represent a 180-degree reversal from past policy whereby the United
States took significant steps to repatriate Eurodollar business from
overseas.220

C. InternationalAgreements
Italian economist Guido Carli, who wrote about the
Eurocurrency market in the 1970s and 1980s, posited that, "[i]f we do
not accept an [international] 'authority', the problem cannot be
solved." 221 Carli envisioned a "more orderly organisation of the
international monetary system with supernational authority
exercising: (a) supervisory function, to give common directions, and
(b) as a lender of last resort, to intervene and regulate any runs on
deposits." 222

available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/billconerly/2013/10/25/future-of-the-dollar-asworld-reserve-currency/ [http://perma.cc/HXE9-VRSC] (archived Feb. 28, 2014).
216.
Greenberg, supra note 26, at 1507.
217.
See Congressional Research Serv., Summary: H.R. 3962, supra note 53
(describing Congress's failed attempt at enacting such legislation).
218.
See, e.g., Chrystia Freeland, Sheriff of Global Banking Rides into Town,
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Ironically, Carli attributed a preoccupation with monetary
sovereignty as a barrier to solutions to problems caused by
Eurocurrencies. 223 After all, an international agreement is a
voluntary abrogation of sovereignty and theoretically undermines a
country's own ability to set its monetary policy. 224 However, such
theoretical objections have not stood in the way of past agreements.
The international community successfully weaned itself off the gold
standard at Bretton Woods and has agreed to three rounds of Basel
Accords with an express purpose of making the international banking
system safer. Furthermore, the risks posed by the failure of the
market represent a much greater affront to monetary sovereignty
than a voluntary political agreement or set of transnational rules.
Given this balance, the best possible solution to manage the risks
posed by the Eurodollar market is an international one.225
1.

Multilateral Agreements Imposing Reserve Requirements

A simple but effective way of managing the Eurodollar market
would be for various nations to ensure that their banks' reserve
requirements are distributed in proportion to the denomination of
their foreign currency liabilities. For example, Country X could adopt
a system requiring their banks to hold reserves in U.S. dollars in
proportion to the amount of Eurodollar liabilities on their books. Such
a requirement would mitigate the risk of foreign banks lending
dollars that their respective central banks cannot insure and reduces
the likelihood that such banks would have to turn to the Federal
Reserve's discount window in the event that their dollar-denominated
debts were called. Furthermore, the Federal Reserve would be able to
manage the dollar-denominated credit given to foreign central banks,
thus cutting off the spigot of reserve dollars that foreign commercial
banks would need access to in order to meet reserve requirements.
Instead of lending dollars to mitigate a crisis, 22 6 the Federal Reserve
could choose to lend dollars-or not lend them-prophylactically.
This structure could be applied to banks across the world and
could be implemented by international treaties or ad hoc bi- and
multi-lateral agreements. For example, in exchange for imposing a
dollar-denominated reserve requirement on Japanese banks, the
Federal Reserve would impose a yen-denominated reserve
requirement on American banks.2 27

223.
Id. at 145-46.
224.
Cf. id. (noting that "this sovereignty can only be practised in the context of
international agreements establishing a reference framework" as opposed to,
presumably, a binding agreement).
225.
See Frydl, supra note 66, at 11 (advocating for an international agreement).
226.
Via central bank liquidity swap lines, for example. See supra note 85.
227.
Cf. He & McCauley, supra note 42, at 10 (discussing the "strangeness" of
just such a requirement).
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A regime of quid pro quo reserve requirements would effectively
address the underlying problem posed by the Eurodollar market: the
large credit multiplier. First, banks' willingness to lend Eurodollars
would be diminished due to the desire to avoid increasing their own
reserves. Next, reserve requirements would undermine the principle
motivation for borrowers or traders to prefer Eurodollar financing
over traditional financing by reducing the spread between Eurodollar
and traditional interest rates. Increased costs would eliminate banks'
ability to offer preferential rates, which would be reduced or
eliminated.2 28 With the preferential rates eliminated, the Federal
Reserve's monetary controls would have restored effectiveness.
2.

Elimination of the Eurodollar by International Agreement

Many of the problems associated with the United States
attempting to unilaterally forbid the creation of Eurodollars could be
mitigated by an international agreement prohibiting financial
institutions from creating Eurocurrencies. First, an international
agreement would make it much easier to wind down the market.
Second, as explained by Morgan Ricks, there is no reason that
nondepository financial institutions (e.g. hedge funds and investment
banks) need to fund themselves with short-term deposits. 229 Their
cost of borrowing would probably increase, but there is no reason to
assume that the financial industry would fail without cheap short
term IOUs. 230 Investors and borrowers would just turn to longer-term
debt instruments. Furthermore, such an approach is internally
consistent. So long as governments regulate which institutions may
fund themselves with run-of-the-mill demand deposits, Why not also
regulate which institutions can fund themselves with Eurocurrencies,
which are fundamentally equivalent instruments? 231
3.

Obstacles to International Agreements

There are, of course, problems with an international approach to
Eurodollar regulation. Perhaps the most obvious is compliance. With
respect to reserve requirements, nations would have to voluntarily
assent to what, in all likelihood, would be measures that reduced the
profitability of their banking industries. The United States might
have the ability to coerce smaller economies into agreeing to the
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See supra note 65 and accompanying text. Interest rate parity would
presumably also make the Eurodollar market less attractive to arbitrageurs, further
reducing the volume of transactions. Cf. supra note 104 and accompanying text.
229.
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230.
Ricks, A Former Treasury Adviser on How to Really Fix Wall Street, supra
note 5.
231.
See id. ("Instead of focusing narrowly on deposits, we should address shortterm IOUs as a class, on a functional basis.").
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scheme, but such behavior would violate international norms and
ultimately be ineffective unless other major economies also
assented. 232
The next challenge is the possibility of nations trying to gain a
competitive advantage by intentionally flouting international
controls.23 3 Countries could profit by taking business away from the
current financial centers just as London profited from having a
regulatory advantage over the United States in the 1960s. 234 Nations
whose currencies are not subject to large Eurocurrency markets are
mostly likely to attempt to game the system as they have less to gain
by quid pro quo reserve requirements. Thus, without widespread
voluntary cooperation an international scheme would be vulnerable
to significant leakages.
However, these obstacles presuppose that other countries have
less of an interest in the global financial system than the United
States. This is not a safe assumption. After all, Eurocurrencies do not
just pose a threat to monetary sovereignty; they pose a threat to
global financial stability. We need not look far into the past in order
to see that the international community has been able to coalesce
around big changes in the international banking system: Bretton
Woods, the Basel Accords, and the founding of the Bank of
Inte'rnational Settlement all represent the international community
coming together to bolster the stability of the global economy. There
is no reason to think that the same cannot be accomplished with
respect to Eurocurrency markets.
4.

Disclosure Requirements

Writing in 1983, Ronald Greenberg eschewed the more
traditional modes of regulation discussed above in favor of requiring
banks to "disclose the nature and character of Eurodollar loan
recipients. 235 Greenberg thought that the practical obstacles to any
sort of market regulation were too large to achieve effective
regulation and proposed transparency as an alternative. 236 Disclosure
mechanisms would be easier to implement and would in theory allow
the market to assess the riskiness of Eurodollar loans made by
banks. 23 7 Additionally, the cost of disclosure requirements is much
lower than that of more robust regulation. 238
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There is nothing inherently problematic about Greenberg's
proposal, but it is dated. The upheaval in financial markets since
2007 demonstrates the need for regulation with teeth rather than
simple oversight. Improved disclosure would not have revealed the
extent of the risk posed by mortgage-backed securities because the
securities themselves were considered safe investments. 23 9 Moreover,
to the extent that the risk posed by the Eurodollar market is its size,
no further disclosure is required. The $5 trillion Eurodollar market is
large enough that its failure would cause catastrophic damage to the
financial system.

D. Consequences of Continued Inaction
As long as Eurodollar markets are allowed to continue to operate
unregulated, the international community remains at risk of widescale panics caused by a disruption in the international market for
U.S. dollars, and the Federal Reserve remains on the hook as the
global lender of last resort. In 2008, global Eurodollar operations
nearly caused an international shortage of dollars. 240 The effects of
this near panic are still being felt today: as of February 2014, the
European crisis is ongoing and the Federal Reserve's central bank
liquidity swap lines remain open. 24 1 Furthermore, the underlying
problems have not been fixed. A default of the European banks would
cause a run on money market mutual funds, which have trillions of
dollars worth of exposure to short-term debt. 24 2 A run on the money
market mutual funds is a short step away from a run on dollars. 24 3
The Eurocurrency markets represent a pile of dry tinder, and until it
is fixed, one can only hope it does not go up in flames.

VI. CONCLUSION

The financial system has changed dramatically over the last 50
years. Financial markets are larger and more interconnected than
ever. The market for Eurodollars is a microcosm of the challenges
posed by these realities: larger and more interconnected systems lead

239.
See Paul Krugman, Berating the Raters, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2010),
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to larger and more interconnected crises. However, it is hard to
imagine a solution that eliminates Eurodollars entirely. Ultimately
this would not be a problem if: (1) the market for Eurocurrencies was
not so large that it posed systemic risk if it failed, and (2)
Eurocurrencies were not completely beyond the control of the Federal
Reserve. The reversal of either one of these realities would mitigate
concerns regarding both U.S. monetary sovereignty and global
financial stability.
This Note has been an attempt to demystify the Eurodollar and
describe the risks these instruments present. It has also described
why regimes intended to safeguard the financial system are
inadequate to deal with the problems presented by the Eurodollar
market. Consequently, it argued for the need for an international
framework governing the Eurodollar market, not only for the sake of
global financial stability but also because of the unique challenges to
monetary sovereignty caused by foreign lenders creating dollars
without regard to U.S. authorities. The main challenge to such a plan
is international cooperation. However, if the international community
can successfully implement three rounds of Basel Accords, it seems
that an additional implementation of reserve requirements for
Eurodollars is not outside the realm of possibility. Sensible reform
can and should be implemented to manage risk. After all, such
controls are preferable to global market failures.
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